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UNITED STATES V. ARTHREX, INC.: CLARIFYING 




Article II of the United States Constitution details the methods by which presidential 
subordinate officers must be appointed. Despite its presence in the Constitution’s original text, the 
Appointments Clause remains ambiguous. The Clause provides different appointment processes for 
principal and “inferior officers,” but does not distinguish between these officers’ functions. In United 
States v. Arthrex, Inc., the Supreme Court must clarify the relationship between an Executive 
officer’s responsibilities and their appointment process. 
Arthrex, Inc. (hereinafter “Arthrex”), a medical device manufacturer, holds a patent for a device 
that reattaches soft tissue to bone (the “907 patent”).1 In 2015, the company filed suit in Federal 
District Court against Smith & Nephew, Inc. (hereinafter “Smith & Nephew”), a fellow medical 
device company. Arthrex alleged that the latter’s soft tissue reattachment device infringed the 907 
patent.2 In response, Smith & Nephew requested that the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) review the patent’s validity.3 Both parties agreed to resolve the dispute through 
a USPTO administrative proceeding called inter partes review (“IPR”).4 The IPR determined that 
Arthrex’s 907 patent was invalid because the design had been publicly disclosed before being 
granted, thus making it “prior art.”5 Arthrex appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit, but this 
time raised a constitutional argument as to why Smith & Nephew should lose: The IPR’s 
adjudicators, administrative patent judges (“APJs”), were principal officers whose appointments 
violated the Constitution.6 During this appeal, Petitioner United States intervened.7 
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 1.  Brief for Arthrex, Inc. at 8, U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 19-1434, 19-1452, & 19-1458 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Brief for 
Arthrex]. 
 2.  Opening Brief for Smith & Nephew, Inc. and Arthrocare Corp. at 9, U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 19-1434, 19-1452, & 19-1458 
(U.S. Nov. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Brief for Smith & Nephew]. 
 3.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 9 (referencing the Patent Office). 
 4.  Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 9. 
 5.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 9. 
 6.  Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
 7.  Brief for the United States at II, U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 19-1434, 19-1452, & 19-1458 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Brief 
for U.S.]. 
BARKAN_5_1_21_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2021  11:32 PM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY                                                      [VOL. 16 
The Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[o]fficers of the 
United States” are to be nominated by the President and appointed “by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate.”8 Officials who must be appointed this way are called principal officers.9 
Article II further provides Congress discretion to create an alternative appointment process for 
“inferior officers.”10 These “inferior officers” may be appointed by “the President alone . . . the 
Courts of Law[] or . . . the Heads of Departments.”11 
Originally a mere patent dispute, United States v. Arthrex, Inc. has reached the Supreme Court 
with two outstanding questions.12 First, are APJs principal officers who must be nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate? Second, if APJs are principal officers, what should be done 
to cure the constitutional defect in their current appointments? The implications of this case are 
significant. The Executive Branch employs approximately 12,000 adjudicative officers (also known 
as administrative judges).13 If the Court determines APJs can be classified as principal officers, then 
the Court will likely hold the appointments of at least hundreds of similar adjudicators 
constitutionally infirm.14 
This commentary first provides an overview of the USPTO and of APJs, and then discusses the 
case’s applicable legal doctrines. The analysis will then focus on the parties’ briefs and oral 
arguments. Finally, the merits of the respective positions will be evaluated, concluding that Arthrex 
should prevail on its claims. 
I. FACTS 
This section will first summarize the history of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
and its administrative patent judges. Subsequently, the rationale behind the Federal Circuit’s 
decision will be discussed. 
A. History of the USPTO and APJs 
Since the Republic’s founding, the Executive Branch has been comprised of numerous 
Departments staffed by both principal and “inferior officers.”15 Founded in 1836,16 the USPTO is a 
Department of Commerce agency17 that oversees the granting and revoking of patents.18 The 
USPTO is supervised by its Director, a principal officer.19 APJs serve under the guidance of the 
Director; these judges hear appeals from various USPTO decisions.20 From their creation in 1861 up 
 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 9.  Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  This case comes before the Court on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court below 
found APJs to be principal officers based on a three-factor test derived from Edmond v. United States. As a remedy, the court severed 
APJs’ for-cause removal protections, to sway the balance of factors back towards “inferior officer” status. Subsequently, the court 
declined to rehear the case en banc. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 953 
F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 13.  Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 42. 
 14.  Id. at 40. 
 15.  See id. at 21–22 (detailing the 1789 creations of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of War); Brief for Arthrex, 
supra note 1, at 27 (detailing the Treasury Department’s creation in 1789). 
 16.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 3. 
 17.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 3. 
 18.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. 
 19.  35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a)(1)–(2). 
 20.  35 U.S.C. § 6(a)–(b). 
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until 1975, APJs and their predecessors21 were appointed by the President with Senate 
confirmation.22 Since 1975, however, the Secretary of Commerce has appointed APJs “in 
consultation with the [USPTO] Director.”23 Since then,24 APJs have had Title 5 tenure protections 
which limits removal “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.”25 Title 5 
protections originated with the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (“the APA”), which sought to 
preserve judicial impartiality in administrative proceedings.26 Since the APA’s enactment, the 
“traditional model” for administrative judge decisions has been “transparent review by accountable 
agency heads” who retain power to reject decisions.27 
APJs serve on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “PTAB”).28 In 2011, Congress introduced 
several adjudicatory procedures29 including the inter partes review, a “party-directed, adversarial,” 
process akin to litigation.30 In IPR, the PTAB reviews and cancels any issued patent it deems 
unpatentable.31 The Director retains final authority over whether to grant IPR,32 and IPR outcomes 
are reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.33 The Director can choose which 
members will (and will not) adjudicate a proceeding,34 can create PTAB rules and regulations,35 and 
may give policy directives.36 No PTAB decision (IPR or otherwise) is precedential without Director 
approval.37 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision 
In its Arthrex, Inc. opinion, the Federal Circuit only concerned itself with Arthrex’s 
constitutional challenge.38 It agreed with Arthrex that APJs are principal officers whose 
appointment process is therefore unconstitutional.39 The court relied on Edmond v. United States in 
 
 21.  Before 1999, APJs were known as “examiners-in-chief.” Their offices were created by Congress in 1861. Brief for Arthrex, 
supra note 1, at 3, 5. 
 22.  See id. at 4 (summarizing the history of presidentially-appointed patent judges). 
 23.  See id. Between 1999 and 2008, Congress authorized the Director to nominate and appoint APJs. However, after the 
constitutionality of this authority was questioned (the Director is not a department head), Congress reallocated the power back to the 
Secretary of Commerce. Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–313, §1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
6(a)). 
 24.  See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–601, §2, 88 Stat. 1956, 1956 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 3(c)). 
 25.  5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). 
 26.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
 27.  Id. at 51. 
 28.  35 U.S.C. § 6(a). The PTAB consists of APJs, the Director, and other officers. Id. It conducts each review with at least three 
members, whom the Director personally chooses. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). Until 2011, the PTAB reviewed patent revocations through 
“examinational” processes. See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 6 (referencing the switch from an examination to an adjudicative 
proceeding for inter partes reexamination); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt.1, at 45–46 (2011) (explaining that third-parties that 
challenged patents through these processes had extremely limited roles in them once initiated). That year, Congress decided to make 
PTAB processes “objective, transparent, clear, and fair” by giving disputants more control over cases. 157 CONG. REC. S1380 (2011) 
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 29.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 6–7 (detailing the various new procedures). 
 30.  SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). 
 31.  Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016). 
 32.  35 U.S.C. § 314(d). 
 33.  See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (giving no such power to the Director); see also 35 U.S.C. § 141 (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive 
review of PTAB decisions in post-grant reviews and ex parte reexaminations). 
 34.  35 U.S.C. § 6(c). 
 35.  35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). 
 36.  35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A). 
 37.  U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 at 8 (10th 
rev. 2018).  
 38.  See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (vacating the PTAB’s decision because its 
APJs were unconstitutionally appointed and therefore not reaching the merits of the case), reh’g denied, 953 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 39.  Id. at 1325. 
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its analysis—deriving at least three factors for determining whether APJs are actually “inferior.”40 
The court opined that41 at least two of the following must be true for any “inferior officer”42: 1) a 
principal officer can review and reverse their adjudicative decisions; 2) a principal officer has 
sufficient “supervision and oversight” over them; and 3) a principal officer can remove them.43 
Though APJs were sufficiently subject to the Director’s “supervision and oversight,”44 no principal 
officers reviewed their decisions,45 and they could only be removed for-cause.46 Seeking the 
narrowest remedy that still respected Congress’s USPTO design, the Federal Circuit severed Title 5 
removal protections from applying to APJs.47 Without these protections, APJs become removable 
at-will—tilting the balance of Edmond factors towards classification as “inferior officers.”48 The 
court then vacated the PTAB’s decision and remanded the case back to the USPTO.49 All three 
parties unsuccessfully petitioned for a rehearing en banc.50 Several judges, however, dissented from 
the denial because they disagreed with the court’s initial judgment.51 On June 25, 2020, all three 
parties petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted on October 
13, 2020.52 
II. LEGAL HISTORY 
The two issues before the Court entail separate, though sometimes overlapping, legal histories. 
This section will first analyze the Appointments Clause’s origin and its subsequent judicial 
understanding. Then, this commentary will evaluate severance doctrine. 
A. The Nature of Administrative Patent Judges 
The Constitution’s Appointments Clause states that: [The President] shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . [o]fficers of the United States . . . but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior [o]fficers, as they think proper, in 
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”53 
The Clause’s default structure for appointments—nomination by the President and 
confirmation by the Senate—is rooted in concern for political accountability. In The Federalist 
Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote that this structure ensures both political branches would be 
 
 40.  See id. at 1334 (“We do not mean to suggest that the three factors discussed are the only factors to be considered. However, 
other factors which have favored the conclusion that [APJs are] . . . inferior officer[s] are completely absent here.”). 
 41.  The court’s rule is largely inspired by the D.C. Circuit’s in Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 
which applied Edmond to Copyright Royalty Judges. See Intercollegiate Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (“[Edmond] emphasized three factors . . . .”), reh’g denied, 2012. 
 42.  See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1335 (finding that two of the three factors weighed towards principal officer status). 
 43.  See id. at 1329 (expressing the rule in terms of an appointed official’s supervisory powers, but concluding that neither of the 
USPTO’s “presidentially-appointed officers . . . exercise[] sufficient . . . supervision over [APJs].”) (emphasis added). 
 44.  Id. at 1332.  
 45.  See id. at 1331 (“APJs have substantial power to issue final decisions on behalf of the United States without any review by a 
presidentially-appointed officer . . . [T]his supports a conclusion that APJs are principal officers.”). 
 46.  Id. at 1334. 
 47.  See id. at 1338 (“[W]e are convinced that Congress would preserve the statutory scheme it created for reviewing patent grants 
and that it intended for APJs to be inferior officers. Our severance of the limits on removal of APJs achieves this.”). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 1338–39. 
 50.  Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 953 F.3d 760, 761 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom., 141 S.Ct. 549 (2020). 
 51.  See id. at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (finding that severance defies Congressional intent and that there are less disruptive 
remedies); id. at 781 (Hughes, J., dissenting) (determining that APJs are “inferior officers” and that, regardless, severance is not an 
appropriate remedy); id. at 788 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (concluding that APJs are not principal officers). 
 52.  U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 549, 550 (2020).  
 53.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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accountable for bad appointments.54 Different concerns likely spurred the more flexible 
appointment mechanism for “inferior officers.” The Supreme Court believes this flexibility 
demonstrates the Framers’ concerns that appointments would become “inconvenient” as offices 
increased.55 The Court frames this flexibility as reflective of a tradeoff, where convenience outweighs 
accountability only when appointing “inferior officers.”56 
The Appointments Clause does not define “officers” or “inferior officers.”57 In United States v. 
Germaine, the Court defined an “officer” as anyone “who can be said to hold an office under the 
[Federal] government.”58 Almost a century later, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court elaborated further, 
defining an “officer” as “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States.”59 As for the difference between principal and “inferior officers,” the Court drew no 
meaningful distinction until Morrison v. Olson in 1988.60 There, the officer in question was an 
independent counsel appointed to investigate Executive Branch officials.61 The Court declined to 
distinguish principal from “inferior officers”62 but deemed the independent counsel “inferior” 
because: 1) she could be removed by a superior officer;63 2) her duties were limited;64 and 3) her 
office had a de facto time limit.65 
With Morrison in mind, the Court finally addressed the differences between principal and 
“inferior officers” in 1997 with its decision in Edmond v. United States, examining the Coast Guard 
Court of Criminal Appeals (the “Coast Guard Court”). The judges under examination were 
appointed by the Secretary of Transportation.66 The Coast Guard Court’s decisions could be 
reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.67 The appellants argued, in 
part, that some of the Coast Guard Court judges were principal officers whose appointments were 
unconstitutional.68 In its analysis, the Court first noted that “inferior” generally denotes “a 
relationship with some higher ranking officer,” so an “inferior officer” must have a superior.69 It 
justified this determination with evidence of how the 1st United States Congress structured 
Executive officer positions.70 The Court also considered the Appointments Clause’s structural 
 
 54.  See THE FEDERALIST NO.77 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If an ill appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and 
the Senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.”). Hamilton also believed that 
public accountability would stop the Executive Branch from abusing its necessarily broad, discretionary powers. See THE FEDERALIST 
NO.70 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing the importance of Executive “energy” in ensuring Federal laws are observed, while noting 
that the “greatest securities [the people] can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power” is “the restraints of public opinion.”). 
 55.  See U.S. v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878) (“But foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals 
necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress 
might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.”). 
 56.  See Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (“[C]onvenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome 
procedure only with respect to the appointment of ‘inferior [o]fficers.’”). 
 57.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 58.  Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510. 
 59.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
 60.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672–73 (1988) (noting that merely a “few previous decisions” required determining the 
status of a particular officer).  
 61.  Id. at 667. 
 62.  Id. at 671. 
 63.  See id. (“[T]he fact that she can be removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and 
authority.”). 
 64.  See id. (“[The] grant of authority does not include any authority to formulate policy for the . . . Executive . . . .”). 
 65.  See id. at 672 (“[W]hen [the] task is over the office is terminated, either by the counsel herself or . . . the Special Division.”). 
 66.  Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 653 (1997). The judges heard appeals from court-martials. Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 655–56. 
 69.  Id. at 662. 
 70.  See id. at 663–64 (discussing the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of War which designated supervisors as 
principal officers). 
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concern for political accountability.71 With these two principles in mind, the Court ruled that an 
“inferior officer” is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level” by a principal 
officer.72 
Though the Court ultimately held the Coast Guard Court judges to be “inferior officers,”73 its 
analysis did not clearly define what “directed and supervised at some level” entails.74 The Court 
considered several different factors in reaching its decision but did not explain how to weigh them.75 
For instance, the Court factored in the ability of the Judge Advocate General (“JAG”) to remove 
judges at-will but went no further than to opine that “[t]he power to remove officers . . . is a powerful 
tool for control.”76 The Court also placed substantial weight on the ability of principal officers to 
review Coast Guard Court decisions.77 While acknowledging this review power was limited, the 
Court said scope was irrelevant because “[w]hat is significant is that the [Coast Guard Court] judges 
. . . have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do 
so by other Executive officers.”78 
Since 1997, only one Supreme Court case has directly applied Edmond to an Appointments 
Clause question. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Court 
considered whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) consisted of principal or “inferior officers.” The 
Court noted that the SEC could manage the PCAOB’s budget, regulate its operations, relieve it of 
authority, and amend its sanctions.79 Combined with the SEC’s ability to remove PCAOB members 
at-will,80 these powers gave the Court “no hesitation” in finding that PCAOB members were 
“inferior officers.”81 Nevertheless, the Court did not expressly specify a weight for any one factor.82 
Therefore, as it currently stands, an “inferior officer” is one “whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by” a principal officer.83 The meaning of “directed and supervised at some 
level” remains a point of contention. 
B. Severance as a Remedy 
Severance, when a court invalidates a portion of an unconstitutional statute to make it 
 
 71.  See id. at 662–63 (“It is not enough that other officers . . . formally maintain a higher rank . . . in the context of a clause designed 
to preserve political accountability relative to important government assignments . . . .”). 
 72.  Id. at 663 (emphasis added). 
 73.  Id. at 666. 
 74.  See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“These factors are strong indicators of the 
level of control and supervision appointed officials have over the officers and their decision-making on behalf of the Executive Branch.”) 
(noting that the Court in Edmond emphasized three factors without specifying a rule for determining whether an individual is principal 
or inferior officer), reh’g denied, 953 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 75.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664–65; see also Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1329 (assigning equal weight to all three distilled Edmond factors). 
 76.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664. 
 77.  See id. (“The [JAG’s] control . . . is . . . not complete . . . [he] has no power to reverse decisions . . . [but] [t]his . . . power does 
reside . . . in another Executive Branch entity, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.”). The Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces is administered by the Department of Defense. 10 U.S.C. § 941. 
 78.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665. 
 79.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 504 (2010). 
 80.  In the original authorizing statute, the SEC could only remove PCAOB members for-cause. However, because the SEC itself 
could not be removed by the President at-will, the PCAOB had two levels of removal insulation. The Court held this unconstitutional, 
and its remedy was to sever the PCAOB’s own for-cause removal requirement. Id. at 486–87, 508–09.  
 81.  See id. at 510 (“Given . . . the [SEC] power to remove Board members at[-]will, and given the . . . other [SEC] oversight 
authority, we have no hesitation in concluding that under Edmond the Board members are inferior officers . . . .”). 
 82.  But see id. at 504 (finding removal power to be a stronger supervisory mechanism than “[b]road power over [PCAOB] 
functions,” though this statement was made in dicta). 
 83.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. 
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constitutional, derives from the Court’s cognizance that a “ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates 
the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”84 Therefore, “a court should refrain from 
invalidating more of [a] statute than necessary.”85 Severance is only appropriate if: 1) it cures all 
constitutional defects; 2) the statute can function without the severed portion; and 3) the statute 
remains evidently consistent with Congress’s “basic objectives.”86 
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court determined that severance would mitigate the Appointments 
Clause issue.87 PCAOB members benefitted from two layers of for-cause removal protection: SEC 
Commissioners could only remove them for-cause, but the Commissioners themselves were only 
removable for-cause by the President.88 The Court held that this two-level insulation from at-will 
removal violated the Appointments Clause because it obstructed presidential accountability for 
PCAOB actions.89 The Court remedied the situation by severing for-cause removal from the 
PCAOB’s authorizing statute.90 It justified this decision by finding that the remainder of the 
authorizing statute could independently function, and that there was no evidence Congress “would 
have preferred no [PCAOB] at all to a [PCAOB] whose members are removable at[-]will.”91 
Most recently, in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court 
severed a for-cause removal restriction on the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (the “CFPB”).92 The Court found that even without the restriction, the CFPB’s authorizing 
statute “remain[s] fully operative” with regards to the Bureau’s “structure and duties.”93 And there 
was no evidence to suggest Congress preferred the CFPB be found entirely unconstitutional; in fact, 
the authorizing statute expressly required that its remainder stay effective in the event of 
severance.94 
The Court has firmly established that severance is appropriate when a statute can maintain its 
underlying purpose without the severed portion. Precedent regarding the Appointments Clause, 
however, is less clear. Therefore, the novelty of Arthrex, Inc. lies in this latter issue. 
III. UNITED STATES V. ARTHREX, INC. 
In this case, both Petitioner and Respondent Smith & Nephew argue that administrative patent 
judges are “inferior officers.” Respondent Arthrex maintains its position from appeal that 
administrative patent judges are principal officers. Despite these differences, all parties reject the 
Federal Circuit’s three-factor Edmond test and instead present alternative Edmond interpretations. 
Each party believes their own interpretation reflects historical understanding and political practice. 
 
 84.  Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). Use of severance to remedy an unconstitutional statute goes back to the early days of 
the Republic. Indeed, in the 1803 case Marbury v. Madison, the Court severed an unconstitutional provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179–80 (1803); see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S.Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020) (“The Court’s 
power . . . to partially invalidate a statute . . . has been firmly established since Marbury v. Madison.”). 
 85.  Regan, 468 U.S at 652. 
 86.  U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005). 
 87.  Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508 (2010). 
 88.  Id. at 486–87. 
 89.  See id. at 508 (severing for-cause removal for PCAOB members because “Congress may [not] deprive the President of adequate 
control over the [PCAOB] . . . .”). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 509. 
 92.  Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020). 
 93.  Id. at 2209. 
 94.  See id. (“[N]othing in the text or history . . . demonstrates Congress would have preferred no CFPB to a CFPB supervised by 
the President.”); 12 U.S.C. § 5302 (“If any provision of this Act . . . is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder . . . shall not be 
affected . . . .”). 
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Petitioner and Smith & Nephew argue severance was unnecessary, whereas Arthrex deems 
severance improper “judicial policymaking” because the Federal Circuit had multiple remedies 
from which to choose. 
A. The Nature of Administrative Patent Judges 
Disagreement over whether APJs are principal or “inferior officers” is based primarily on 
interpretations of legal and political history. The parties also raise different policy concerns, 
including potential consequences for presidential accountability. 
1. Prior Decisions and Statutory Arguments 
Arthrex believes that for administrative judges to qualify as “inferior officers,” their 
adjudications must be reviewable and modifiable by principal officers.95 It reaches this conclusion 
based on the Court’s proposition in Edmond that “[w]hat is significant” for “inferior officer” status 
is that a principal officer could keep decisions from being final.96 Arthrex contends that without 
review, administrative judges decisively speak on the Executive Branch’s behalf.97 Given the 
Appointments Clause’s accountability concerns, the absence of review by superiors is a “hallmark 
of principal officer status.”98 Therefore, Arthrex concludes that because their decisions cannot be 
reviewed by any principal officer, APJs are not “inferior officers.”99 
Both Petitioner and Smith & Nephew argue that Edmond does not render specific criteria 
necessary for an officer to be “inferior.” Instead, they both interpret Edmond for the proposition 
that “a court should consider the cumulative effect of the supervisory mechanisms available to 
various [principal] officers.”100 This view “respect[s] Congress’s prerogative” to design Executive 
offices as it sees fit.101 Further, both Petitioner and Smith & Nephew argue that this interpretation 
supports the efficiency goal underlying the Appointments Clause’s flexibility towards “inferior 
officers.”102 Smith & Nephew also reads two Court decisions, Lucia v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as categorizing administrative judges 
who made final decisions “inferior officers.”103 
Both Petitioner and Smith & Nephew argue that other supervisory mechanisms placed on APJs 
cumulatively substitute decision review. Petitioner argues that the Secretary of Commerce has 
“substantial” removal power under Title 5, including the power to remove APJs for failing to follow 
 
 95.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 20. 
 96.  Id. at 20–21. 
 97.  Id. at 22. 
 98.  Id. Arthrex believes that the power to remove APJs does not render them “inferior officers” because this power does not 
include the ability to undo their decisions. Id.  
 99.  Id. at 23 (determining that APJs are fundamentally different from principal officers). 
 100.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 20; see also Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 32 (“The Federal Circuit’s rigid test fails 
to account for the cumulative effect of principal [o]fficers’ full range of supervisory powers.”). 
 101.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 24; see also Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926) (describing the various powers vested in 
Congress). 
 102.  See Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 24 (“[Our proposed] approach is also practically workable.”); see also Brief for Smith & 
Nephew, supra note 2, at 23 (“Edmond’s pragmatic distinction . . . maintains flexibility, as Congress can readily ascertain whether it can 
select an alternate method of appointment for a particular [o]fficer.”). 
 103.  Id. at 35–36. Freytag determined that Tax Court special trial judges were “inferior officers” despite the Chief Judge’s power to 
authorize them to “render . . . decisions of the Tax Court in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases.” Freytag 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991). In Lucia, on the other hand, the Court solely addressed whether SEC 
administrative law judges were officers to begin with. Lucia v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018). However, the Court 
noted that the special trial judges in Freytag were “near-carbon copies” of the judges in Lucia. Id. at 2052. 
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orders.104 Thus, a de facto at-will removal power exists because APJs can be removed for failure to 
comply with the Director’s promulgations.105 In addition, the Director controls APJs’ assignments, 
which Smith & Nephew argues is akin to “powerful” assignment removal in Edmond.106 Both parties 
also stress that, like the JAG in Edmond, the Director can promulgate adjudicative procedure.107 
They also highlight the Director’s ability to issue directives on patent law application to hypothetical 
fact patterns, which APJs must use to decide cases with similar facts.108 Further, the Director can 
designate PTAB decisions as non-precedential, and can choose a panel to decide whether a decision 
should be reheard.109 Thus, the Director “has other means of preventing or limiting the reach of 
decisions with which he disagrees.”110 
Arthrex counters these arguments by first noting that even if the power to remove an 
administrative judge may substitute review, this power is not an appropriate substitute here. The 
Director’s removal power is too limited: “Title 5 . . . provides robust procedural rights in connection 
with any removal,” including a right to an appeal.111 Indeed, Arthrex cites Seila Law for the 
proposition that an “inefficiency” standard cannot “be interpreted to reserve substantial 
discretion.”112 And in any event, Arthrex contends, a robust removal power would defy Congress, 
which intended APJs be immune to outside pressure.113 Arthrex also contends that the Director’s 
removal power is limited because the power applies only to individual PTAB assignments, not APJs’ 
appointments.114 
Arthrex further argues that reassignment likely violates due process because it hinders an 
impartial adjudication.115 For this contention, Arthrex cites both academic criticism116 as well as the 
Sixth Circuit’s statement that “[t]here is no guarantee of fairness when the one who appoints a judge 
has the power to remove [them] . . . before the end of proceedings for rendering a decision which 
displeases . . . .”117 Taken together, Arthrex’s arguments seek to rebut the claim that alternative 
mechanisms of control can replace principal officer review. 
2. History and Policy Arguments 
Arthrex justifies its Edmond interpretation118 by emphasizing presidential accountability: In 
 
 104.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 105.  See id. at 38 (“[T]he [Commerce] Secretary’s power to remove . . . in conjunction with the Director’s power to prescribe the 
rules [APJs] must follow, enables those superiors to ensure that their will is carried out.”). 
 106.  See Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 35 (“Where, as here, the [principal officer] has other supervisory mechanisms 
for inducing . . . compliance, including reassignment, there is no reason to insist upon at[-]will removal from employment as a 
constitutional touchstone.”). 
 107.  Id. at 26–27; Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 29. 
 108.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 5; Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 27. 
 109.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 37. 
 110.  Id.; see also Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 26–27 (“Because the Director has these mechanisms for controlling the 
content of APJ[s’] decisions on the front end, there is little need . . . to review decisions on the back end.”). 
 111.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 37. 
 112.  See id. at 36 (“The President [cannot] [] ‘remove an officer based on disagreements about agency policy.’”) (quoting Seila Law 
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2206 (US 2020)).  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See id. at 38 (“The threat of receiving a paycheck while not being assigned any work does not have the same potency as the 
threat of losing one’s job.”). 
 115.  See generally id. at 41–42 (explaining lower courts have rejected “panel stacking” and other mechanisms that allow Directors 
to manipulate administrative panels as violating due process). 
 116.  See id. (“The notion of due process . . . is mocked when the PTAB is allowed to stack a panel with sympathetic judges, contrary 
to the practice of every other court.”) (quoting Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform, 19 FED. SOC. REV., 124, 
128 (2018)). 
 117.  See id. at 41 (quoting Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 118.  Petitioner contends that appointing APJs without Senate confirmation increases the President’s political accountability. Brief 
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Seila Law, the Court stated that “the Framers made the President the most democratic and 
politically accountable official” in order to check his vast power.119 Pursuant to this design, Arthrex 
argues that the President can and should be held culpable for the successes and failures of Executive 
officers. Therefore, all final Executive Branch actions (including patent decisions) must be made by 
either the President or those personally selected by him: principal officers.120 
Smith & Nephew raises the concern that finding APJs to be principal officers would call into 
question the appointments of “over 100 other administrative adjudicators who issue more than 
85,000 decisions each year without further review . . . .”121 Smith & Nephew also invokes the “great 
weight” deference given to “[l]ong settled and established” political practice122 when it argues that 
Congress has always viewed APJs and their predecessors as “inferior officers.”123 Smith & Nephew 
supports this position with legislative history that indicates the 1975 reforms124 were for efficiency 
purposes, suggesting Congress did not view the changes as only then making APJs’ predecessors 
“inferior officers.”125 
Arthrex rejects this historical interpretation—arguing that principal officer review of 
administrative adjudications is the norm.126 Arthrex quotes Attorney General (and later, Supreme 
Court Justice) Robert Jackson, who articulated the “long-continued policy of Congress [to] 
jealously confine[] the power of final decision in matters of substantial importance to . . . principal 
administrative officers.”127 Arthrex also challenges Smith & Nephew’s inference about the 1975 
reforms, and argues that Congress did not weigh constitutional consequences.128 
B. Severance as a Remedy 
Petitioner and Smith & Nephew believe severance was unnecessary because APJs are already 
“inferior officers.”129 Arthrex, on the other hand, argues that severance did not cure the actual 
constitutional defect,130 and that severance may create a due process violation because it limits 
 
for U.S., supra note 7, at 25. 
 119.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 18–19 (“The Framers deemed an energetic [E]xecutive essential . . . .”) (quoting Seila 
Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020)). 
 120.  See id. at 19 (“[T]he Appointments Clause makes the President and the principal officers he personally selects accountable for 
[E]xecutive action, so that the public may hold the President responsible for any success or failure.”). 
 121.  Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
 122.  Id. at 43 (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rel’s Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014)). 
 123.  Id. Though APJs’ predecessors were appointed via presidential nomination and Senate confirmation until 1975, both Smith & 
Nephew and Petitioner argue that this practice did not mean the predecessors were considered principal officers; rather, their 
confirmation method is simply the “default manner” for appointments unless Congress provides otherwise. Id. at 44 (quoting Edmond 
v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997)); see also Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 43 (“The method of appointment . . . does not imply that 
Congress viewed those officials as principal officers.”). 
 124.  Before 1975, appointments were through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 
4. 
 125.  See Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 45 (“Congress selected this method of appointment because presidential 
nomination and senatorial confirmation had become a ‘burden.’”) (quoting Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Tech., 792 F. App’x 
820, 829 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Hughes, J., dissenting)). 
 126.  See generally Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 27–30 (“Principal officer review remains a cornerstone of the modern 
administrative state.”).  
 127.  Id. at 29 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 76-986, at 10 (1940)). 
 128.  Compare id. at 33 with Brief for Smith & Nephew, supra note 2, at 45 (arguing that by 1975, Congress already believed APJs 
were not principal officers).  
 129.  See Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 39 (arguing that because “inferior officer” status is determined by the cumulative effects of 
various supervisory mechanisms, the “singular focus” on removal power was not correct). 
 130.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 45; see also U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (holding that severance can only be 
appropriate if the remaining statute is constitutional). 
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impartial decision-making.131 The due process concern is heightened here because if severance 
applied, the Director would lack transparent methods to influence APJs.132 Further, Arthrex 
contends that severance is inconsistent with Congress’s desire for autonomous APJs, as expressed 
in both the PTAB’s structure and by individual members of Congress.133 Arthrex also argues that 
severance is inappropriate because of “[t]he sheer multitude” of other available remedies, noting 
that at least ten other remedies have been proposed by either Arthrex itself, the other two parties, 
or amici.134 Arthrex believes the Court should allow Congress to use “the range of policy choices” 
available to make reform.135 
Finally, Arthrex distinguishes this case from both Seila Law and Free Enterprise Fund by 
emphasizing that in both of those cases, severance cured the constitutional defect.136 Further, the 
officers in both Seila Law and Free Enterprise Fund whose removal protections were severed were 
mostly responsible for policymaking and rule enforcement, not adjudications.137 Arthrex believes 
that while “Congress has no settled tradition of granting tenure protections [for officers] with broad 
policymaking and enforcement authority,” there is such a tradition for officers who merely 
adjudicate.138 Arthrex concludes that this tradition applies to APJs.139 
IV. ORAL ARGUMENT 
During oral arguments, the Court spent much of its time probing four distinct areas of concern: 
1) due process; 2) practicality; 3) prior decisions and historical practice; and 4) remedy.140 
A. Petitioner and Smith & Nephew 
During its oral argument, Smith & Nephew faced due process challenges several times.141 Justice 
Roberts suggested that using the Director’s current control mechanisms to prevent an adjudication 
from being final would make a “charade” out of the process.142 In response, counsel for Smith & 
Nephew consistently emphasized that the Court did not grant certiorari to answer due process 
questions.143 Likewise, Petitioner defended its position from multiple practicality challenges. Justice 
Thomas asked how Petitioner would determine when its cumulative Edmond test was met.144 
Petitioner answered that while there is no bright-line determinant, the Court should “primarily” 
 
 131.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 63–64 (“Due process requires a ‘neutral and detached’ decisionmaker . . . [a]lthough this 
Court has not decided whether at[-]will removal of administrative judges violates due process, the question is widely recognized to be 
substantial.”) (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972)). 
 132.  See id. at 64 (“Those due process concerns are magnified here . . . [b]y denying the Director review power, Congress encouraged 
him to resort to subtle and indirect means . . . [a] system where adjudicators decide cases subject to hidden influences . . . is at best 
constitutionally dubious.”). 
 133.  Id. at 54–55 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 259). 
 134.  Id. at 56–59. Arthrex notes that Congressional remedies include giving the Director review power, reforming APJs’ 
appointment processes, and eliminating IPR. Id. at 57–58. 
 135.  Id. at 59. 
 136.  Id. at 60. 
 137.  See id. at 60–61 (“The CFPB Director in Seila Law . . . performed adjudicative functions only . . . as one component of her vast 
responsibilities [citation omitted]. Similarly, the PCAOB . . . in Free Enterprise Fund . . . performed adjudicatory functions only in that 
they also oversaw . . . disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 138.  Id. at 61. 
 139.  Id. at 62 (“Eliminating those protections here would be a radical departure from tradition.”). 
 140.  Oral argument took place on March 1, 2021. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., (U.S. argued Mar. 1, 2021) 
(No. 19-1434). 
 141.  Id. at 29–30, 40–41. 
 142.  Id. at 29–30. 
 143.  See id. at 30, 41 (“Due process is a separate issue, not presented in the petition, not presented in this case.”).  
 144.  Id. at 8. 
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consider whether mechanisms exist for prospectively instructing an officer on their duties.145 Justice 
Barrett questioned the effectiveness of the Director’s non-absolute removal power.146 Petitioner 
conceded that while the Director did not have final say on removal, he did on reassignment, an 
“important” tool for control.147 
Justice Gorsuch asked Petitioner if Seila Law required an “inferior officer” be subject to 
“ongoing” presidential “supervision and control.”148 Justice Gorsuch expressed doubt whether this 
requirement was met for administrative judges whose decisions were not subject to Executive 
review.149 Petitioner countered, in part, that the Federal Circuit could review decisions.150 Combining 
caselaw interpretation with practicality concerns, Justice Sotomayor challenged Justice Gorsuch’s 
understanding of Seila Law as “totally at odds with an adjudicatory system of any kind.”151 
Justice Kavanaugh focused on history, and voiced concerns that the tradition of principal officer 
review indicates the PTAB’s constitutional infirmity.152 Acknowledging this tradition, Petitioner 
nevertheless stated its position that review need not be “plenary” under Edmond.153 Smith & 
Nephew responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s concerns by noting that the Director is still the officer 
who must ultimately cancel any unpatentable claim.154 Smith & Nephew ended its oral argument 
with the proposition that principal officers “sit at the right hand of the President and make national 
policy.”155 Sympathetic to this position, Justice Sotomayor stated during Arthrex’s oral argument 
that the “founding generation” of elected representatives understood principal officers as 
department heads.156 
B. Arthrex 
Arthrex faced formidable practicality challenges during its oral argument. Justice Roberts 
voiced doubt as to whether the Director could give “meaningful review” of all PTAB decisions.157 
Arthrex responded that the Director could delegate review power but would nevertheless be 
accountable for the delegate’s decisions.158 Justice Roberts similarly wondered why case law and 
legal principles do not support giving administrative judges substantial leeway to impartially resolve 
disputes.159 Arthrex responded that placing an adjudicator in the Executive Branch requires 
presidential accountability in decisions.160 Arthrex added that impartial decision-making and post-
decision review are traditionally used to ensure that administrative judges comply with the will of 
the Executive Branch.161 
 
 145.  Id. at 8–9. 
 146.  Id. at 25. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 19. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 20–21. 
 151.  Id. at 36. 
 152.  Id. at 22, 41–42. 
 153.  Id. at 23. 
 154.  Id. at 43. 
 155.  Id. at 46. 
 156.  See id. at 66 (“In early debates and enactments that structured [E]xecutive department[s], heads of the department[s] were . . . 
referred to as principal officers and other members as inferior officers.”). 
 157.  Id. at 52. 
 158.  Id. at 52–53. 
 159.  Id. at 49. 
 160.  Id. at 50. 
 161.  Id. 
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Arthrex encountered questions regarding proper remedy—stating that it found no case law162 to 
justify the Court picking one of several remedies instead of deferring to Congress.163 Justice Alito, 
however, challenged the wisdom of deference, and asked why the Court could not simply read into 
the statute a review requirement.164 Arthrex reiterated its stance that choosing a remedy is a policy 
choice which should be left for Congress.165 
V. ANALYSIS 
Edmond must be read in light of the Appointments Clause’s main structural concerns: political 
accountability and efficiency. Furthermore, the adjudicative nature of administrative patent judges 
means due process concerns must also be considered. Combined with historical practice, these 
considerations should lead the Court to hold that administrative judges are “inferior officers” only 
if a principal officer can prevent their decisions from being final. Therefore, the Court should find 
APJs are principal officers. As for remedy, the Court should concur with Arthrex’s claim that the 
remedy is best left for Congress to decide on. 
Ultimately, the President must be responsible for “inferior officer” actions taken on his behalf. 
As discussed, both the Appointments Clause’s structure and the Framers’ own words emphasize fair 
public accountability for bad decisions. If the President or someone appointed by him could not 
block a binding “inferior officer” action, the President would not be directly responsible for that 
action.166 Though not controlling here, the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund to strike down 
dual-layers of for-cause removal illuminates the analysis. Because neither the SEC nor the PCAOB 
could be removed at-will, the latter were not accountable to the President.167 This structure, the 
Court found, was unconstitutional because the President could no longer “ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed.”168 The underlying principle of Free Enterprise Fund is cogent: The President 
must, as a matter of duty and policy, be responsible for “inferior officer” actions.169 
In light of this need for responsibility, administrative adjudications must reflect the President’s 
will. This reflection is only possible if adjudications are made or approved by someone 
presidentially-nominated.170 At first glance, Edmond indicates, and Free Enterprise Fund confirms, 
at least two other methods to “direct and supervise at some level”: removal and general oversight. 
This conclusion, however, is incorrect with regards to administrative judges. Though a “powerful 
tool for control,”171 at-will removal cannot ensure that adjudications reflect presidential views. As 
Arthrex points out, assignment removal does not guarantee that a specific adjudication will turn out 
a certain way.172 Nor does removal alter prior adjudications.173 And threatening removal, either from 
 
 162.  Id. at 80, 84–85. 
 163.  Id. at 87. 
 164.  Id. at 63. 
 165.  Id. at 64. 
 166.  The public, in turn, could not effectively voice its displeasure with this action by voting, because the President would not be 
responsible. Also, this analysis presumes that the “inferior” appointment method chosen is not the default one (presidential nomination 
and Senate confirmation). Otherwise, the President is fairly responsible because he chose the officers. 
 167.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010) (“Without the ability to oversee the [PCAOB], or 
to attribute the [PCAOB]’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer the judge of the [PCAOB]’s conduct.”). 
 168.  Id. at 498. 
 169.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit confirmed this view, stating that “[t]he lack of control over APJ[s’] decisions does not allow the 
President to ensure the laws are faithfully executed.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019), reh’g 
denied, 953 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  
 170.  Of course, the President could lawfully review administrative adjudications himself, but that would be infeasible. 
 171.  Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997). 
 172.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 42 (“Altering panel composition might permit the Director to influence outcomes . . . .”). 
 173.  Id. (“Rules or policy guidance may enable the Director to affect future decisions, but they do not permit him to correct or undo 
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assignment or office, to achieve a desired outcome raises due process concerns because it 
compromises judicial impartiality.174 In resolving this constitutional question, the Court should not 
create a new constitutional problem.175 As Arthrex mentioned, the “traditional model” is impartial 
adjudication followed by principal officer review.176 Though due process may not be perfectly 
compatible with ensuring that adjudications reflect presidential will, this conflict is inevitable177 
when it comes to administrative judges; the traditional model minimizes its magnitude. 
While at-will removal may well be an “inferior officer” quality for Executive officials charged 
with policy or regulatory creation, it cannot serve as a tool for adjudicators. The nature of their 
responsibilities prevents at-will removal from ensuring fair presidential accountability in a lawful 
manner. 
In determining that Coast Guard Court judges were “inferior officers,” the Court in Edmond 
twice noted that principal officers could prevent their decisions from being final.178 That the Court 
called this ability “significant”179 for purposes of its analysis reveals its importance. And though the 
Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise Fund did not subsequently emphasize principal officer review, it 
did not have to because the PCAOB was not a primarily adjudicative body; amongst other things, 
the PCAOB also “promulgate[d] auditing and ethics standards . . . [and] perform[ed] routine 
inspections of all accounting firms . . . .”180 Nevertheless, the SEC could amend PCAOB sanctions—
analogous to a principal officer reviewing adjudicative decisions.181 
Within the context of administrative judges, “supervision and oversight” is unnecessary because 
only review power can ensure that an adjudication reflects Executive will. In the case of APJs, 
sample fact patterns and other procedural directives cannot perfectly dictate a hearing’s outcome.182 
Patent law application to unique fact patterns is still subject to varying interpretations, and 
procedure does not provide substantive standards. Furthermore, even if the Director declares a 
decision non-precedential, it nevertheless binds the parties to the hearing.183 Therefore, “supervision 
and oversight” cannot ensure fair presidential accountability for administrative adjudications. 
Of course, Congress can structure “inferior” offices as it sees fit, mindful of efficiency concerns.184 
However, this discretion does not eliminate fundamental political accountability requirements.185 
These offices must still be designed to ensure the President is accountable for their occupants’ 
actions. For administrative judges, this means their offices must be structured such that their 
 
decisions that misapply his directives.”).  
 174.  See id. at 41 (“There is no guarantee of fairness when the one who appoints a judge has the power to remove . . . before the end 
of proceedings for rendering a decision which displeases . . . .”) (quoting Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 175.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 176.  Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 51. 
 177.  During oral argument, both Smith & Nephew and Arthrex acknowledged this tension. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–
37, 49–50, U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc. (U.S. argued Mar. 1, 2021) (No. 19-1434) (“[T]here is . . . an inherent tension in agency adjudicatory-type 
proceedings between adjudicative independence and presidential control . . . .”). 
 178.  Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1997). 
 179.  Id. at 665. 
 180.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 485 (2010). 
 181.  Id. at 504. 
 182.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 43 (“The Director can promulgate regulations . . . [b]ut he has no general rulemaking 
authority over substantive patentability standards.”). 
 183.  Id. at 44. 
 184.  Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 24–25; see also Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926) (“To Congress under its legislative power 
is given the establishment of offices, [and] the determination of their functions and jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 185.  See Brief for U.S., supra note 7, at 25 (“To be sure, the Constitution prevents Congress from creating or structuring offices in a 
manner that . . . fails to maintain political accountability for the Executive Branch’s actions.”). 
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decisions are reviewable and, if necessary, reversible by principal officers. 
Arthrex validly argues that final Executive adjudicative decisions have historically been 
rendered by principal officers. Yet, Smith & Nephew’s interpretation of legislative history is more 
appropriate. The Court should not, as Arthrex suggests, infer that Congress in 1975 was indifferent 
towards whether APJs were principal or “inferior officers.” The Court “will . . . not lightly assume 
that Congress intended to . . . usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.”186 This canon of statutory 
construction acknowledges “that Congress . . . is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.”187 Though intent is distinct from indifference, suggesting that Congress did not care 
whether it was misappropriating principal officer appointment power undermines Congress’s 
integrity. Therefore, the Court should acknowledge that APJs and their predecessors were 
historically deemed “inferior officers.” Since 1975, however, APJs’ responsibilities have become 
mostly adjudicative in nature.188 Therefore, APJs must now be understood in light of Congress’s 
“[l]ong settled and established practice”189 of deeming Executive adjudicators who make final 
decisions principal officers. 
As a result, the Court should find that APJs are principal officers whose appointments are 
unconstitutional.190 Though the Director retains various control mechanisms, he cannot reverse or 
review APJs’ decisions. Their adjudications decisively speak for the Executive. Severance, however, 
is not the proper remedy here. It does not cure the constitutional defect because it does not alter 
how APJs’ decisions are finalized. If anything, severance creates a constitutional due process issue 
because APJs cannot serve impartially without removal protection. Furthermore, Congress 
intended impartial adjudication: in creating IPR, it sought to ensure a “fair” and “objective” 
process.191 As Representative Jerry Nadler stated, without removal protections, “litigants will be left 
wondering if the decision they receive truly represents the impartial weighing of facts and evidence 
under the law.”192 If APJs cannot impartially operate as Congress intended them to, then it is also 
unlikely that their authorizing statute can function without Title 5, or that Congress’s “basic 
objectives” in structuring their offices remain met.193 Thus, severance is inappropriate. As an 
alternative, the Court should defer to Congress to amend the authorizing statute as it sees fit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Appointments Clause reflects early recognition that a workable republic requires both 
political accountability and bureaucratic efficiency. Political accountability, however, is paramount. 
In creating Executive Branch offices, Congress must ensure that appointment processes do not 
erode presidential power, responsibility, and accountability. This mandate entails that when an 
officer is appointed as an “inferior” type, their actions must be directly supervised by either the 
 
 186.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See Brief for Arthrex, supra note 1, at 33 (“Congress vastly expanded APJs’ [powers] . . . . Congress also made APJs much 
more like typical administrative law judges . . . .”). 
 189.  Nat’l Lab. Rel’s Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014). 
 190.  This outcome may force Congress to amend many statutes that structure Executive officer appointments. See Brief for Smith 
& Nephew, supra note 2, at 38–39 (“[O]ver 100 other administrative adjudicators who issue more than 85,000 decisions each year without 
further review within the Executive Branch . . . are not appointed as principal [o]fficers . . . .”). However, for reasons given in this 
commentary, these statutes are unconstitutional and must be changed regardless of burden.  
 191.  157 CONG. REC. S1380 (2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 192.  The Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the Appointments Clause: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. & the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 45:45-46:03 (2019) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary). 
 193.  U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005). 
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President or someone the President appointed. For “inferior officers” who are administrative judges, 
adequate supervision entails that a principal officer can review their decisions and prevent those 
decisions from becoming final. This rule acknowledges the unique nature of Executive Branch 
adjudications, and respects historical attitudes towards them. Therefore, APJs are not “inferior 
officers” because their decisions cannot be reviewed by a principal officer. As for remedying their 
unconstitutional positions, the Court should defer to elected representatives for next steps. Congress 
created APJs, and it should decide how to properly regulate them. 
Based on oral argument, it appears likely that the Court will agree with Arthrex. The focus of 
several Justices on remedy, combined with the due process concerns echoed throughout the 
proceedings, likely reflect the Court’s inclination to find APJs’ appointments unconstitutional. As 
for deciding a proper remedy, the multiplicity of options combined with historical deference to 
political branches will likely lead the Court to let Congress decide next steps. 
 
